Removal of Directors of State-Owned Companies – SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Limited (81056/14) [2017] ZAGPJHC 289 by Cassim, Rehana
147 
 




REMOVING  DIRECTORS  OF  STATE-OWNED  
COMPANIES 
 
SOS  Support  Public  Broadcasting  Coalition  v 
South  African  Broadcasting  Corporation  SOC 






In SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation SOC Limited; SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v 
South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Limited ((81056/14) [2017] 
ZAGPJHC 289 (17 October 2017)) (SOS Support Public Broadcasting 
Coalition v SABC), the Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg was faced 
with two applications brought against the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation SOC Limited (the SABC) by the SOS: Support Public 
Broadcasting Coalition, the Freedom of Expression Institute and the 
Trustees of the Media Monitoring Project Benefit Trust. The Minister of 
Communications (the Minister) and Mr Hlaudi Motsoeneng (the former chief 
operations officer of the SABC) were, inter alia, joined as respondents. Both 
applications related to the constitutionality and lawfulness of the powers 
exercised by the Minister in respect of the directors of the SABC board. The 
applications were instituted against a “background of systematic and 
repeated failures in the governance and management of the SABC” (SOS 
Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC supra par 1). 
    The first application concerned the lawfulness of the powers vested in the 
Minister by virtue of the amended Memorandum of Incorporation (MOI) of 
the SABC (the amended MOI) and the SABC Board Charter (the Charter) in 
respect of the appointment, discipline and suspension of the executive 
directors of the SABC. The second application concerned the power of the 
Minister to remove the executive and non-executive directors of the SABC 
board from office. The focus of this note is on the second application, 
although the first application will also be addressed, albeit briefly. This note 
evaluates the judgment in this case, and its implications for state-owned 
companies. 
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2 The  facts 
 
2 1 The  first  application 
 
In the first application, the court was required to determine whether certain 
provisions of the amended MOI and the Charter were consistent with the 
Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999 (the Broadcasting Act) and the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). The Broadcasting Act 
regulates the SABC, a national public broadcaster. This Act requires the 
SABC to comply with the Charter (s 6(1)). Under section 12 of the 
Broadcasting Act, the SABC board must comprise twelve non-executive 
directors and three executive directors – namely, the group chief executive 
officer, the chief operations officer and the chief financial officer. While the 
Act indicates that the non-executive directors must be appointed by the 
President on the advice of the National Assembly (s 13(1)), it is silent on the 
appointment of the executive directors. The SABC and the Minister 
contended that such silence meant that the Broadcasting Act either 
permitted or did not preclude the appointment process prescribed in the 
amended MOI and the Charter (par 120). The applicants, on the other hand, 
contended that the provisions in the amended MOI and the Charter were 
invalid. 
    The amended MOI (amended by the Minister in September 2014) and the 
Charter together confer extensive powers on the Minister over the executive 
directors of the SABC. These include powers relating to their appointment, 
terms and conditions of appointment, discipline and suspension. For 
example: 
(i) the amended MOI provides that the appointment of the executive 
directors must be confirmed by the Minister before they may be 
appointed (clause 13.5.1); 
(ii) the amended MOI (clause 13.5.3) and the Charter (clause 8.2) confer 
on the Minister a power of veto over the appointment of the executive 
directors, and there is no limit on the number of candidates that the 
Minister may veto; 
(iii) the Minister is permitted to effectively waive the requirement of the 
board to advertise and shortlist candidates who apply for the position 
of executive director (clause 13.5.2); 
(iv) the Minister has an unfettered discretion in the appointment process 
of the executive directors since no appointment criteria are prescribed; 
(v) any decision taken by the Minister to reject the candidates 
recommended by the board is immune from challenge by the board or 
any interested person (clause 13.5.3); 
(vi) the terms and conditions of the executive directors’ employment 
contracts and their reappointment are made subject to the Minister’s 
approval (clauses 13.5.5, 13.5.6 and 13.5.7); 
(vii) the institution of any disciplinary proceedings against the executive 
directors and their suspension are made subject to the Minister’s 
approval (clauses 13.7.1, 13.7.2 and 13.7.4); and 
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(viii) whereas previously the board alone had the power to recommend the 
removal of a board member from office, the amended MOI gives the 
board or the Minister the power to do so (clause 14.3.1.3). 
    In general, the amended MOI diverts power over the administration and 
operations of the SABC board away from the board in favour of the Minister, 
and extends new powers to the Minister. 
 
2 2 The  second  application 
 
In the second application, the court was required to determine whether the 
non-executive directors had been validly removed from office by the Minister 
in terms of section 71 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Companies 
Act). In terms of section 8A(2) of the Broadcasting Act, the State is the sole 
shareholder of the SABC. The Minister, as the sole shareholder 
representative of the SABC, removed three non-executive directors under 
section 71(1) of the Companies Act. The applicants sought a declaratory 
order that members of the SABC board could not be removed from office 
save in compliance with sections 15 and 15A of the Broadcasting Act. They 
also sought an order setting aside the Minister’s removal of the non-
executive directors under section 71(1) of the Companies Act. The crisp 
issue for determination was which legislative provisions applied to the 
removal of directors of the SABC board: section 71 of the Companies Act, or 
sections 15 and 15A of the Broadcasting Act? 
    Under section 15(1)(a) of the Broadcasting Act, the “appointing body” may 
remove a “member” from office after due inquiry and upon due 
recommendation by the board of directors if such member is found guilty of 
misconduct or inability to perform his or her duties efficiently (author’s own 
emphasis). The “appointing body” is the body charged with the appointment 
of members of the board in terms of section 13 of the Broadcasting Act (s 1 
of the Broadcasting Act). A “member” is defined in section 1 of the 
Broadcasting Act to mean executive and non-executive members of the 
board. The appointing body, in terms of section 1 read with section 13 of the 
Broadcasting Act, is the President acting on the advice of the National 
Assembly. The board of directors of the SABC is thus not empowered to 
remove a director on its own, although it may make such a recommendation 
to the President, who has a discretion whether or not to remove a board 
member from office. 
    Under section 15(1)(b) of the Broadcasting Act, the appointing body must 
remove a board member after due inquiry by the National Assembly and the 
adoption of a resolution recommending the removal of the director in terms 
of section 15A of the Broadcasting Act (author’s own emphasis). Under 
section 15A(1)(a), the National Assembly may, after due inquiry and by the 
adoption of a resolution, recommend the removal of a board member on 
account of misconduct, inability to perform the duties of his or her office 
efficiently, absence from three consecutive board meetings without the 
permission of the board (except on good cause shown), failure to disclose a 
conflict of interest in terms of section 17, or on the basis of a disqualification 
as contemplated in section 16. 
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    In essence, a board member may be removed by the President under 
section 15(1)(a) (on the recommendation of the board of directors), but must 
be removed by the President (on the recommendation of a committee of the 
National Assembly) under section 15(1)(b) read with section 15A(1)(a). 
    In contrast, under the Companies Act, a director may be removed from 
office by the shareholders by an ordinary resolution adopted at a 
shareholders’ meeting under section 71(1) of the Companies Act, or by the 




3 1 The  first  application 
 
The court, per Matojane J, ruled that the powers granted to the Minister 
(under the amended MOI and the Charter) – to appoint, re-appoint and 
discipline executive directors – undermine the independence of the SABC, 
which independence is required by the right to freedom of expression 
(including the freedom of the media) under section 16 of the Constitution 
(par 117). Section 16 of the Constitution enshrines the right of the public, 
being the audience of the SABC, to access information and ideas (par 31). 
The court stated that the freedom to receive or impart information or ideas 
relates to the right of the SABC to communicate without interference 
(par 31). The powers conferred on the Minister by the amended MOI and the 
Charter, the court proclaimed, are inconsistent with the specific 
independence and pluralism required of a public service broadcaster 
(par 117). The court observed that the SABC board does not report to the 
Minister, but to the National Assembly. The board is consequently meant to 
be strictly independent, and is not required to work with other government 
agencies (par 48). 
    The court held further that the requirement of an independent SABC is 
implied in the duty of the State (under section 7(2) of the Constitution) to 
protect and promote the rights in the Bill of Rights, which include the right to 
freedom of expression and a free press (par 52). Since the SABC is the 
medium that should allow the free flow of ideas necessary for our democracy 
to function, the court held that the State must ensure that the SABC has the 
necessary structural and operational independence (par 52). The court 
emphasised further that the independence of the SABC is vital for the 
exercise of citizens’ rights to vote, and to free and fair elections under 
section 19 of the Constitution. This is because the SABC is the primary 
source of political information for the majority of South Africans, who would 
be unable to exercise their right to vote meaningfully without access to 
independent and pluralistic information and opinion (par 60−61). If political or 
private interests govern the media, the court asserted, South Africans would 
not be provided with the accurate, neutral and pluralistic information they 
require to make the right to vote meaningful (par 63). 
    In coming to its conclusion that the Minister does not have the power to 
manage the affairs of the SABC, the court relied on section 13(11) of the 
Broadcasting Act. This provision stipulates that the “[b]oard controls the 
affairs” of the SABC and “must protect matters referred to in section 6(2) of 
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[the Broadcasting] Act”. Section 6(2) requires the Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa to monitor the SABC and enforce 
its compliance with the Charter. The court stated that sections 13(11) and 
6(2) require the SABC board to control the affairs of the SABC and to ensure 
that the SABC complies with the Charter (par 121). It held that the Minister, 
as the representative of the SABC’s sole shareholder and not a member of 
the SABC board, does not have a right to act on behalf of the SABC or to 
manage its business or affairs (par 122). It is Parliament, the court stressed, 
and not the Minister, that represents the public interest and performs an 
oversight role on behalf of the public (par 126). Since the effect of section 
13(11) of the Broadcasting Act is to confer on the board the exclusive power 
to control the affairs of the SABC, the court found that the Minister is 
precluded from exercising any powers to control the directors in how they 
control the affairs of the SABC (par 127). 
    The court consequently ruled that the powers granted to the Minister 
under the amended MOI and the Charter to appoint, re-appoint and 
discipline executive directors undermine the independence of the SABC. It 
accordingly declared certain clauses of the amended MOI and the Charter to 
be invalid and inconsistent with the Broadcasting Act (par 146). The 
declaration of invalidity was suspended for one year to allow the defects to 
be remedied. The court held further that the executive members of the 
SABC board are to be appointed solely by the non-executive members of 
the board, without any requirement for approval by the Minister (par 146). 
The court ordered the non-executive members of the SABC board to follow a 
process that ensures transparency and openness, including publicly 
advertising the positions and conducting interviews of suitable candidates 
(par 146). 
 
3 2 The  second  application 
 
The court ruled that the provisions of section 71 of the Companies Act do not 
apply to the SABC board (par 141). It found that the removal processes 
prescribed under the Companies Act undermine the independence of the 
SABC board in a manner that is inconsistent with the Constitution (par 141). 
The court proclaimed that if the board members could be unilaterally 
removed at the instance of the Minister as sole shareholder or by a simple 
majority vote of the board, “without any oversight, on any ground, and 
without due enquiry” this would inhibit board members from expressing 
views that are not aligned with the State or the majority board members (par 
143). The court stated (par 145): 
 
“The Broadcasting Act is not listed under section 5(4)(b)(i) of the Companies 
Act, according, [sic] none of the provisions of the Broadcasting Act, is made 
applicable in the event of inconsistency with the Companies Act. This bridges 
[sic] section 7(2) and 16 of the Constitution and the relevant provisions of the 
Companies Act are invalid to this extent.” 
 
    The court consequently declared that the members of the SABC board 
may not be removed from office save in compliance with sections 15 and 
15A of the Broadcasting Act (par 146). It also set aside the removal of the 
two non-executive directors on the ground that the removals had unlawfully 
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been effected under section 71 of the Companies Act, and not in accordance 
with the procedures set out in section 15 of the Broadcasting Act (par 146). 
However, the court did not reinstate the two non-executive directors to their 
previous positions on the board, and did not provide any reason for this 
decision. 
 
4 Analysis  and  discussion 
 
4 1 Conflicts  between  the  Companies  Act  and  specific  
legislation  governing  state-owned  companies 
 
Section 9(1) of the Companies Act states that, subject to sections 5(4) and 
5(5) of the Companies Act, any provision of the Companies Act that applies 
to a public company applies also to a state-owned company, except to the 
extent that the Minister has granted an exemption in terms of section 9(3) of 
the Companies Act. It must follow that section 71 of the Companies Act 
applies to the removal of directors of state-owned companies. However, the 
removal of directors of state-owned companies often results in much 
confusion as state-owned companies are governed not only by the 
Companies Act but also by their own specific legislation. For instance, the 
South African Airways SOC Limited is governed by the South African 
Airways Act 5 of 2007, the South African Post Office SOC Limited is 
governed by the South African Post Office SOC Ltd Act 22 of 2011, the 
Armaments Corporation of South Africa SOC Limited (Armscor) is governed 
by the Armaments Corporation of South Africa Limited Act 51 of 2003 (the 
Armscor Act) and the SABC is governed by the Broadcasting Act. Conflicts 
can and do arise between the removal of directors under the governing 
legislation of these state-owned companies and the removal of directors 
under section 71 of the Companies Act. 
    Section 5(4) of the Companies Act states that if there is an inconsistency 
between a provision of the Companies Act and a provision of any other 
national legislation, the provisions of both Acts apply concurrently, to the 
extent that it is possible to apply and comply with one of the inconsistent 
provisions without contravening the second. To the extent that this is not 
possible, the Companies Act lists certain specific Acts that will supersede it 
(s 5(4)(b)(i) of the Companies Act). These Acts are the Auditing Profession 
Act 26 of 2005, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act 2 of 2000, the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA), the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, the 
Securities Services Act 36 of 2000 (which has since been repealed and 
replaced by the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012), the Banks Act 94 of 
1990, the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 
2003, and section 8 of the National Payment System Act 78 of 1998. In all 
other instances of conflict, the provisions of the Companies Act will prevail 
(s 5(4)(b)(ii)). Notably, the Broadcasting Act is not listed as one of the Acts 
that supersedes the Companies Act in the event of a conflict between two 
Acts. 
    One instance where the court was able to read the provisions of the 
Companies Act concurrently with a specific statute that applies to state-
CASES / VONNISSE 153 
 
 
owned companies is Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau 2014 
(5) SA 69 (CC) (Minister of Defence v Motau). The Armscor Act governs the 
affairs of Armscor. Armscor is a state-owned company that was incorporated 
primarily to provide South Africa’s armed services with military material, 
equipment, facilities and services. It is the armaments and technology 
procurement agency of the Department of Defence. The State is the sole 
shareholder of Armscor and exercises ownership control of Armscor through 
the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans (the Minister of Defence) 
(s 2(2) of the Armscor Act). Armscor’s affairs are managed by its board of 
directors, which comprise nine non-executive members and two executive 
members (s 6(1) of the Armscor Act). 
    In Minister of Defence v Motau, the Minister of Defence terminated the 
membership of two members of the board of directors of Armscor in terms of 
section 8(c) of the Armscor Act after they had failed to attend various board 
meetings arranged by her. Section 8(c) of the Armscor Act provides that a 
board member must vacate office if his or her services are terminated by the 
Minister of Defence “on good cause shown”. The directors who had been 
removed from office applied to the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, to 
set aside the decision of the Minister of Defence on the ground that it was 
unlawful, unconstitutional and invalid since it had not complied with PAJA. If 
the dismissal power of the Minister of Defence constituted administrative 
action, she would have to comply with PAJA. If, however, it constituted 
executive action, then the procedures for the removal of directors laid down 
in sections 71(1) and 71(2) of the Companies Act were applicable. The court 
a quo found that the dismissal power of the Minister of Defence had 
constituted administrative action, and that she had failed to comply with 
PAJA (see Motau v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, unreported 
case no 51258/13, North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, 18 September 
2013). The court a quo consequently granted judgment in favour of the two 
directors who had been removed from office. 
    The Minister of Defence appealed to the Constitutional Court. The 
majority judgment of the Constitutional Court disagreed with the court a quo 
that the Minister of Defence’s decision comprised administrative action. It 
held that the Minister’s power to dismiss directors was more executive than 
administrative in nature. This was because it was an adjunct of the power to 
formulate defence policy; it was a high-level power, not a low-level 
bureaucratic power involving the application of policy. The Minister of 
Defence was afforded a broad discretion in exercising the power, which 
indicated that it constituted performance of an executive function rather than 
the implementation of national legislation (par 47, 49 and 51). On the basis 
that the Minister of Defence’s power to dismiss board members constituted 
executive action rather than administrative action, the Constitutional Court 
held that this power was not subject to review under PAJA. 
    The minority judgment disagreed and held that the decision of the Minister 
of Defence to dismiss the board members had constituted administrative 
action (par 128). For this reason, the minority held that it was not necessary 
to determine whether section 71 of the Companies Act had applied to this 
matter. (An analysis whether the dismissal power of the Minister of Defence 
constitutes administrative action or executive action is beyond the scope of 
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this note, but see Konstant “Administrative Action and Procedural Fairness – 
Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau” 2016 133(3) SALJ 
491−504 for a discussion of this point). 
    On the question whether there were any procedural constraints on the 
exercise of the power of the Minister of Defence in terms of section 8(c) of 
the Armscor Act, the Constitutional Court held that section 8(c) of the 
Armscor Act and sections 71(1) and (2) of the Companies Act must be read 
concurrently. The court found that these two provisions are “perfectly 
compatible” (par 76) in that the Armscor Act provides the substantive 
criterion, while the Companies Act provides the process, by which board 
members of Armscor may be dismissed. Thus, in terms of section 8(c) of the 
Armscor Act, a director may be removed from office by the Minister on the 
basis of good cause, but the removal procedure must comply with the 
provisions of section 71(2) of the Companies Act. 
    The Constitutional Court held that in terminating the membership of the 
board members, the failure of the Minister of Defence to comply with the 
procedural requirements of section 71(2) of the Companies Act had 
rendered her actions unlawful (par 77 and 80). The court did not, however, 
set aside the decision and reinstate the two directors since it found that this 
would not be just and equitable in the exceptional circumstances of the case. 
The court found that the Minister of Defence had substantively good and 
compelling reasons for terminating the directorship of the two directors, and 
that she had demonstrated good cause for their removal (par 89). The court 
ruled that it was sufficient to declare that the conduct of the Minister of 
Defence was unlawful and to draw her attention to the proper procedure to 
be followed in dismissing directors of Armscor (par 86 and 94). 
    It is evident from the above discussion that even though section 71 of the 
Companies Act is said to apply to the removal of directors of state-owned 
companies, there is considerable confusion on this issue in circumstances 
where state-owned companies are governed by specific legislation 
regulating the removal of their directors. Challenges arise from the fact that 
state-owned companies are governed by both the Companies Act and by 
their own specific legislation. The case of Minister of Defence v Motau 
illustrates the complexity in this regard in that it may first have to be 
determined whether the dismissal power constitutes administrative action or 
executive action, and whether the Companies Act or PAJA must be applied. 
Furthermore, the substantive criteria for the removal of directors of the state-
owned company may be contained in one piece of legislation governing the 
state-owned company, while the procedural criteria may be contained in 
other legislation. In Minister of Defence v Motau, the Constitutional Court 
succeeded in reading the Armscor Act and the Companies Act concurrently. 
It is not, however, always possible to read the Companies Act concurrently 
with a statute that regulates the affairs of a state-owned company, as is 
illustrated by SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC supra. A 
careful analysis must be made in each case to ascertain whether the 
provisions of the legislation governing the state-owned company and section 
71 of the Companies Act may be applied concurrently and if not, which 
legislation would prevail. 
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    The confusion on whether the removal provisions of the Companies Act or 
the Broadcasting Act prevail was exacerbated in SOS Support Public 
Broadcasting Coalition v SABC supra by the fact that Parliament had initially 
accepted that the Broadcasting Act prevails over the Companies Act, but 
had later changed its mind. On 26 March 2015, three non-executive SABC 
board members were removed from office after the board of directors 
passed a vote of no confidence in them. The Minister subsequently 
endorsed these removals, which had taken place under the Companies Act, 
and not the Broadcasting Act (see Merten “SABC Mess now in Parliament’s 
Care. Don’t Hold your Breath” (14 July 2016) http://www.dailymaverick.co.za 
/article/2016-07-14-sabc-mess-now-in-parliaments-care-dont-hold-your-
breath./#.WAYSvfl95hE (accessed 2017-11-10). The three board members 
who had been removed from the SABC board had been opposed to the 
controversial permanent appointment of Mr Hlaudi Motsoeneng as the chief 
operations officer of the SABC in July 2014, after findings by the Public 
Protector that he had purged staff, irregularly boosted his salary and made 
misrepresentations about having a matric certificate (see SABC v DA 
(393/2015) [2015] ZASCA 156 (8 October 2015) par 13; and the Report of 
the Public Protector titled “When Governance and Ethics Fail” Report No. 23 
of 2013/2014 (17 February 2014) 3−5). 
    At the time, a legal opinion was sought from Parliament’s Constitutional 
and Legal Services division to advise the Portfolio Committee on 
Communications on the legality of the decision to remove the board 
members from office. The legal opinion expressed the view that the removal 
of the directors under the Companies Act was invalid because the 
Broadcasting Act superseded the Companies Act (see Mjenxane “Legal 
Opinion on Powers to Remove Board Members of the SABC” 24 March 
2015 (reference number 31/15) par 21−22). The Portfolio Committee initially 
accepted the legal opinion that the removal of the three board members had 
been unlawful, but subsequently changed its mind and accepted that the 
removal of the board members under the Companies Act was valid. In light 
of the fact that the three board members who had been removed from office 
had not lodged a formal dispute and complaint, the Portfolio Committee 
stated that it was satisfied that due process had been followed in removing 
the directors under the Companies Act. The matter had been officially closed 
(South African Government News Agency “Committee Closes Legal Opinion 
on SABC Board Members” (26 May 2015) http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-
africa/committee-closes-legal-opinion-sabc-board-members (accessed 
2017-11-10)). Two of the three non-executive directors who had been 
removed from office were subsequently cited as the tenth and eleventh 
respondents in SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC supra. 
    It is submitted that there are further statutory provisions that cause 
confusion as to which of the Companies Act or the Broadcasting Act prevails 
are sections 8(5) and 8(6) of the Broadcasting Act. Section 8(5) states that 
the Companies Act applies to the SABC, save to the extent stipulated in the 
Broadcasting Act. Section 8(6) of the Broadcasting Act lists those provisions 
of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 that do not apply to the SABC. The 
provisions of section 8(6) of the Broadcasting Act have not been amended to 
reflect the equivalent provisions of the Companies Act (71 of 2008). Section 
220 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (the predecessor to s 71 of the 
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Companies Act 71 of 2008) is not listed in section 8(6) of the Broadcasting 
Act as one of the provisions that do not apply to the SABC. On a literal 
interpretation, the implication is that the legislature did not intend to exclude 
the removal provisions under section 220 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
(and now s 71 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008) from applying to the 
removal of directors of the SABC board. The High Court in SOS Support 
Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC supra failed to address the further 
legislative conflict caused by sections 8(5) and 8(6) of the Broadcasting Act. 
 
4 2 The  difference  in  the  removal  procedures  under  the  
Companies  Act  and  the  Broadcasting  Act 
 
In comparing the removal provisions under the Companies Act with those 
under the Broadcasting Act, the court in SOS Support Public Broadcasting 
Coalition v SABC supra stated that sections 15 and 15A of the Broadcasting 
Act ensure that there is a level of oversight in the removal of a director of the 
SABC board since neither the Minister nor the board may unilaterally 
remove a director (par 139). The removal of a director requires an inquiry 
and it must be based on specified, objective grounds for removal (par 139). 
When the National Assembly recommends removal, the President has no 
discretion and must remove the director from office (par 139). Section 71 of 
the Companies Act, on the other hand, the court asserted, empowers the 
Minister to remove any member of the board, for any reason, “subject only to 
the requirement of notice under section 71(2)” (par 140). The board of 
directors, the court stated, is empowered to remove any member of the 
board, inter alia, for negligence or dereliction of duty by a simple majority, 
“subject only to the requirement of notice and comment under section 71(4)” 
(par 140). 
    It is submitted with respect that in comparing the removal procedures 
under the Broadcasting Act and Companies Act respectively, the court 
overlooked some of the important oversight provisions contained in section 
71 of the Companies Act. For instance, when shareholders intend to remove 
a director from office under section 71 of the Companies Act, they must give 
the director in question a reasonable opportunity to make a presentation to 
the meeting before putting to vote the ordinary resolution to remove the 
director from office (s 71(2)(b) of the Companies Act). The director need not 
personally give the presentation; he or she may choose any representative, 
including a legal representative. Whether the opportunity given to a director 
(or a representative) to make a presentation is “reasonable” as required by 
section 71(2)(b) would depend on the facts of each case. It is submitted that 
the director must be given a fair opportunity to address the allegations made 
against him or her. It is accordingly not the case that the Minister is 
empowered to remove a director from office subject only to the requirement 
of notice, or without due enquiry, as stated by the court. It is also not correct 
to state that the board of directors is empowered to remove any board 
member subject only to the requirement of “notice and comment” (par 140). 
The board of directors is also obliged to give a director a reasonable 
opportunity to make a presentation to the board meeting, in person or 
through a representative, before the resolution to remove him or her from 
office is put to a vote. 
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    The Constitutional Court in Minister of Defence v Motau (par 79) stated 
that the purpose of sections 71(1) and (2) of the Companies Act was not 
only to ensure that a majority of shareholders assented to a decision to 
dismiss a director, but also to ensure that those whose interests are 
materially affected by the decision are given an opportunity to put forward 
relevant information, and thereby to ensure that the decision makers are 
appropriately informed before making a far-reaching decision. The 
presentation gives a director an opportunity to state his or her case and to 
ensure that he or he is not removed from office on an impulsive vote (Davies 
and Worthington Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law 9ed 
(2012) 412). The presentation is akin to an enquiry under sections 15 and 
15A of the Broadcasting Act, in that a shareholder or board member may 
ask questions of a director relating to the allegations against him or her, and 
the director may state his or her case and address allegations, and ensure 
that the shareholders or the board of directors, as applicable, are fully and 
appropriately informed before voting on the resolution to remove him or her 
from office. There is therefore, contrary to the statement made by the court, 
some level of oversight in the removal of a director under the Companies 
Act. 
    There was a further important level of oversight regarding the removal of a 
director under the Companies Act that was not alluded to by the court in 
SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC supra: under 
section 71(5) of the Companies Act, a director who has been removed from 
office by the board of directors may apply to court to review the board’s 
decision. The review application must be instituted within 20 business days 
of the board’s decision to remove the director from office (s 71(5)). The 
statutory review procedure ensures that a court exercises some oversight 
over the board’s decision to remove a director from office. In contrast, 
sections 15 and 15A of the Broadcasting Act do not make any provision for a 
court to review the decision to remove a director from the SABC board. It is 
therefore not the case, as stated by the court that the removal process under 
the Companies Act “denies members of the SABC Board security of tenure” 
(par 141). 
    The grounds for the removal of a director on a recommendation by the 
National Assembly under the Broadcasting Act are in fact broader and more 
far-reaching than those provided under section 71(3) of the Companies Act 
for the removal of a director by the board of directors. Under section 71(3) of 
the Companies Act, the board of directors may remove a director only if he 
or she is ineligible or disqualified, incapacitated, or has neglected or been 
derelict in the performance of the functions of director. Under 
section 15A(1)(a) of the Broadcasting Act, the National Assembly may adopt 
a resolution recommending the removal of a director from the SABC on 
account of misconduct, inability to perform his or her duties efficiently, 
disqualification, if he or she has been absent from three consecutive board 
meetings without the permission of the board (save on good cause shown), 
and if he or she has failed to disclose a conflict of interest in terms of 
section 17 of the Broadcasting Act. This widens the scope under the 
Broadcasting Act for the removal of a director when compared to the 
Companies Act. 
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    However, the provisions for the removal of a director by shareholders 
under the Companies Act do provide a lower level of security of tenure for 
directors when compared to the Broadcasting Act. This is because the 
Companies Act does not require shareholders to provide any reason for 
removing a director from office. This may be because it is well established 
that when shareholders of a company remove a director from office in terms 
of section 71(1) of the Companies Act, they may exercise their vote to do so 
in any way they please since their right to vote is a right of property that they 
are entitled to exercise in whatever way they desire (see Pender v 
Lushington (1877) 46 ChD 317 319; Re HR Harmer Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 62 82; 
Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) 680; 
Desai v Greyridge Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 (1) SA 509 (A) 519; Kuwait 
Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd [1991] 1 AC 187 (PC) 
221). In order for shareholders to successfully remove a director from office 
under section 71 of the Companies Act, an ordinary resolution must be 
passed. Section 65(8) of the Companies Act specifically prohibits the 
threshold for an ordinary resolution for the removal of a director by the 
shareholders to be increased to more than 51 per cent of the voting rights 
exercised on the resolution. Since the Minister is the sole shareholder 
representative of the SABC, it is only the Minister’s vote that is required to 
remove a director from office. For this reason, a director on the SABC board 
would not have a high level of security of tenure if he or she were to be 
removed by the shareholder representative of the SABC (the Minister). In 
contrast, such a director would have a higher level of security of tenure if 
removal from office were in terms of the Broadcasting Act effected by the 
President on the adoption of a resolution of the National Assembly calling for 
the director’s removal. 
 
4 3 The  statutory  interpretation  of  conflicting  statutes  
under  the  common  law 
 
The common-law principle of interpretation lex specialis derogat legi generali 
states that when two laws govern the same factual situation, a law governing 
a specific subject matter (lex specialis) supersedes a law that governs 
general matters only (lex generalis) (see R v Gwantshu 1931 EDL 29 31; 
Kent NO v South African Railways 1946 AD 398 429−430; Gentiruco AG v 
Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd 1972 (1) SA 589 (A) 603; S v Shangase 1972 (2) SA 
410 (N) 430; S v Hattingh 1978 (2) SA 826 (A) 829; Consolidated Employers 
Medical Aid Society v Leveton 1999 (2) SA 32 (SCA) 40−41; and De Ville 
Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) 79). Another way of stating 
this principle of interpretation is that general rules do not derogate from 
special ones (De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation 79). The 
rationale for this principle of interpretation is that when the legislature has 
given attention to a specific subject and has made special provisions for it, a 
subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with those special 
provisions unless it clearly manifests that intention (see Khumalo v Director-
General of Co-operation and Development 1991 (1) SA 158 (A) 164 and 
Kellaway Principles of Legal Interpretation of Statutes, Contracts and Wills 
(1995) 369). In Kent NO v South African Railways (supra 405) the then-
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Appellate Division formulated this rule of statutory construction by stating 
that statutes: 
 
“must be read together and the later one must not be so construed as to 
repeal the provisions of an earlier one, or to take away rights conferred by an 
earlier one unless the later Statute expressly alters the provisions of the 
earlier one in that respect or such alteration is a necessary inference from the 
terms of the later Statute. The inference must be a necessary one and not 
merely a possible one.” 
 
    In Khumalo v Director-General of Co-operation and Development (supra 
164−165) and Sasol Synthetic Fuels (Pty) Ltd v Lambert (2002 (2) SA 21 
(SCA) par 15), the Supreme Court of Appeal approved the above 
formulation of this rule of statutory construction. This principle of interpreting 
statutes is also recognised in English law. In the UK case of Corporation of 
Blackpool v Starr Estate Company Limited ([1922] 1 AC 27 34), Viscount 
Haldane succinctly formulated this principle of interpretation as follows: 
 
“(W)e are bound . . . to apply a rule of construction which has been repeatedly 
laid down and is firmly established. It is that wherever Parliament in an earlier 
statute has directed its attention to an individual case and has made provision 
for it unambiguously, there arises a presumption that if in a subsequent 
statute the Legislature lays down a general principle, that general principle is 
not to be taken as meant to rip up what the Legislature had before provided 
for individually, unless an intention to do so is specifically declared.” 
 
    On the basis of the common-law principle of interpretation of statutes lex 
specialis derogat legi generali, it is arguable that the provisions on the 
removal of directors contained in the earlier-enacted Broadcasting Act, being 
specific legislation dealing with the governance of the SABC, would prevail 
over the removal provisions in the later-enacted Companies Act, being 
general legislation dealing with state-owned companies. This argument is 
reinforced by the fact that there are no clear, express or specific indications 
that the legislature intended to repeal the provisions of the Broadcasting Act 
when the Companies Act was promulgated. The High Court in SOS Support 
Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC supra failed to apply this common-law 
principle of interpretation of statutes when ascertaining whether the 
Broadcasting Act or the Companies Act prevails where the removal of 
directors is concerned. While the court came to the conclusion that the 
Broadcasting Act prevails over the Companies Act on the basis of the 
applicability of the Constitution, it could, in the alternative, have reached this 
conclusion based on the application of the common-law principle of lex 
specialis derogat legi generali. 
 
4 4 Practical  resolution  of  the  conflict  between  the  
Companies  Act  and  the  Broadcasting  Act 
 
While the High Court in SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC 
supra found that sections 15 and 15A of the Broadcasting Act prevail over 
section 71 of the Companies Act, it did not clarify how the conflict in law 
between the Companies Act and the Broadcasting Act is to be resolved in 
practice. The fact remains that the Companies Act has failed to list, in 
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section 5(4)(b)(i), the Broadcasting Act as one of the statutes that prevails in 
the event of a conflict with the Companies Act. 
    It is suggested that section 5(4)(b)(i) of the Companies Act should be 
amended to include a reference to the Broadcasting Act as one of the 
statutes that prevail over the Companies Act in the case of a conflict 
between the two Acts. Alternatively, it is suggested that the Minister of Trade 
and Industry should be requested, under sections 9(2)(a) and 9(3) of the 
Companies Act, to exempt the SABC from the provisions of section 71 of the 
Companies Act. Under section 9(2) of the Companies Act, the member of 
the Cabinet responsible for state-owned companies may request the 
Minister of Trade and Industry to grant a total, partial or conditional 
exemption from one or more provisions of the Companies Act, applicable to 
all state-owned companies, any class of state-owned companies or to one or 
more particular state-owned company. In terms of section 9(3) of the 
Companies Act, the Minister may, by notice in the Government Gazette after 
receiving the advice of the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission, grant an exemption contemplated in section 9(2) only to the 
extent that the relevant alternative regulatory scheme ensures the 
achievement of the purposes of the Companies Act at least as well as the 
provisions of the Companies Act, and subject to any limits or conditions 
necessary to ensure the achievement of the purposes of the Companies Act. 
Since sections 15 and 15A of the Broadcasting Act would regulate the 
removal of directors of the SABC at least as well as the provisions of the 
Companies Act, it is submitted that the granting of an exemption excluding 
the SABC from the provisions of section 71 of the Companies Act, would 
resolve the legislative conflict between sections 15 and 15A of the 
Broadcasting Act, and section 71 of the Companies Act. 
    It is suggested further that section 8(6) of the Broadcasting Act, which 
sets out those provisions of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 that do not apply 
to the SABC, must be updated to refer to the relevant equivalent provisions 
of the Companies Act (71 of 2008), and must specifically include a reference 
to section 71 of the Companies Act (71 of 2008). In this manner, the 
legislative conflict between the Companies Act and the Broadcasting Act 




This note has critically analysed the High Court’s decision in SOS Support 
Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC supra. Based on the constitutional 
rights contained in section 16 (freedom of expression) and section 7(2) (the 
requirement of the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in 
the Bill of Rights), the High Court ruled that the powers granted to the 
Minister under the amended MOI and the Charter (to appoint, re-appoint and 
discipline executive directors) undermine the independence of the SABC. 
The court stressed that the board of directors of the SABC must be strictly 
independent since it does not report to the Minister, but to the National 
Assembly. The court made it clear that the Minister does not have any legal 
right to control the affairs of the SABC. 
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    The differences between the removal of a director under section 71 of the 
Companies Act and sections 15 and 15A of the Broadcasting Act 
respectively have been discussed. It has been argued that the court, with 
respect, overlooked the fact that section 71 of the Companies Act does 
provide a certain level of oversight where the removal of a director by the 
shareholders and by the board of directors is concerned. It has been 
observed that the court concluded that the removal processes under the 
Broadcasting Act prevail over those prescribed under the Companies Act on 
the basis that, if this were not the case, the independence of the SABC 
would be undermined in a manner that is inconsistent with the Constitution. 
It has been argued that the court could have come to the same conclusion 
on the basis of the application of the common-law principle of interpretation 
of statutes lex specialis derogat legi generali, in terms of which the 
provisions on the removal of directors contained in the Broadcasting Act, 
being earlier-enacted specific legislation dealing with the governance of the 
SABC, would prevail over the removal provisions in the Companies Act, 
being later-enacted general legislation dealing with state-owned companies. 
    It has further been noted that the court did not clarify how the conflict 
between the Companies Act and the Broadcasting Act is to be resolved in 
practice. It is suggested that section 5(4)(b)(i) of the Companies Act should 
be amended to include a reference to the Broadcasting Act as one of the 
Acts that prevails over the Companies Act in the case of a conflict between 
the two Acts. Alternatively, it is suggested that the Minister of Trade and 
Industry should be requested, under sections 9(2)(a) and 9(3) of the 
Companies Act, to exempt the SABC from the provisions of section 71 of the 
Companies Act. In addition, it is suggested that section 8(6) of the 
Broadcasting Act should be amended to specifically include a reference to 
section 71 of the Companies Act (71 of 2008) as one of the provisions that 
do not apply to the SABC. 
    Even though section 71 of the Companies Act is said to apply to the 
removal of directors of state-owned companies, it is evident from Minister of 
Defence v Motau and SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC 
supra that there is considerable confusion on the applicability of section 71 
of the Companies Act where state-owned companies are governed by 
specific legislation regulating the removal of their directors. A careful 
analysis needs to be made in each case to ascertain whether the provisions 
of the specific legislation governing the state-owned company and 
section 71 of the Companies Act may be applied concurrently (as was 
possible in Minister of Defence v Motau) and if not (as in SOS Support 
Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC supra), which legislation would 
prevail. 
    It is submitted that SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC 
supra is a commendable decision that is to be welcomed because it has 
finally resolved the long-standing confusion over the Minister’s powers over 
the SABC’s board of directors, as well as the conflict between the 
Companies Act and the Broadcasting Act with regard to the removal of 
directors of the SABC board. As pointed out by the High Court in its 
judgment, the high rates of illiteracy in South Africa, the limited distribution 
and cost of newspapers and the cost of subscription television make the 
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SABC the “primary source of information for the majority of South Africans” 
(SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC supra par 40). As the 
Constitutional Court stated in South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v 
National Director of Public Prosecutions (2007 (1) SA 523 (CC) par 28), an 
independent media encourages citizens to be actively involved in public 
affairs, to identify themselves with public institutions and to derive the 
benefits that flow from living in a constitutional democracy. If the SABC is not 
independent, this could impact on the quality of democracy in South Africa 
(SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC supra par 39). The 
judgment in SOS Support Public Broadcasting Coalition v SABC supra 
fortifies the independence of the SABC board, and emphasises that the 
board must be run by the board itself, without any control, influence or 
interference by third parties. 
    It should be noted that the Broadcasting Amendment Bill [B39-2015] was 
tabled in the National Assembly on 4 December 2015. This Bill aimed to 
amend the Broadcasting Act. Inter alia, the Bill aimed to amend the 
procedures for the appointment and removal of non-executive members of 
the SABC board. The amendments provided that non-executive members of 
the SABC board had to be appointed by the President on the advice of the 
Minister. The amendments also conferred on the Minister much power to 
remove directors of the SABC board. However, the Bill was withdrawn from 
Parliament on 18 September 2018, and sent back to the Minister to be 
reconsidered. It remains to be seen whether the revised Bill will accord with 
the sentiments expressed by the court in SOS Support Public Broadcasting 
Coalition v SABC supra regarding the independence of the SABC. 
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